Introduction
Since the U.S. attack on Iran and Khamenei’s death in March 2026, the U.S. and South Korean stock markets are expected to see a rise in safe assets such as oil and gold prices, as well as shipping-related stocks due to rising defense, alternative energy stocks, and marine freight rates, along with increased short-term volatility. In particular, technology growth stocks (QQQ, Nvidia, etc.) could face downward pressure due to interest rate sensitivity and inflation concerns, while the aviation, travel and domestic consumer goods sectors could bear the brunt of the oil price shock.
However, if the war ends in a short period of time and a regime change takes place in Iran, there is a possibility that the uncertainty from the Middle East will ease in the long run, which will positively affect the Korean economy. There are also positive observations that large semiconductor companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix will lead the upward trend and avoid the shock. There are also expectations that rising oil prices could reflect on the domestic petrochemical industry, but there is a limit to expecting a structural rebound in the industry as a whole
US attacks on Iran and Khamenei deaths outlined
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel carried out a large-scale military airstrike against Iran, which confirmed the death of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. President Trump hit Iran’s nuclear facilities and military infrastructure with precision, and the Iranian government also officially confirmed Khamenei’s death. Iranian state broadcaster Press TV reported that Khamenei was martyred by U.S. and Israeli attacks in his office in the capital Tehran. After the announcement of Khamenei’s death, President Trump said the operation would continue for several more days, and declared that he would not stop until all U.S. goals were met. As a result, Iran fired back more than 40 ballistic missiles at the U.S. 5th Fleet Base and Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, resulting in three U.S. military injuries. In addition, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has implemented a surprise blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is a major oil export channel, where about 20 percent of the world’s crude oil supply moves.
Iran’s political situation after Khamenei’s death
After Khamenei’s death, Iran’s 37-year-old position as supreme leader of the Islamic theocracy has been left blank. According to Iran’s Constitution, if a supreme leader dies or becomes unable to perform his duties, an emergency committee consisting of the president, the chief justice, and three Islamic law scholars from the Constitutional Council will temporarily act as the supreme leader. The emergency committee will remain in power until the Asylum of Experts elects a new supreme leader.
The likely successor is Ali Larijani, secretary-general of the National Supreme Security Council (SNSC), who is known to have been designated by Khamenei as an agent of his government’s authority during his lifetime. Larijani has served as the chairman of Iran’s parliament in the past and has been deeply involved in nuclear negotiations, and is considered a “crisis manager” type politician who balances hard-liners and moderates. However, experts warn that hard-liners in the IRGC may attempt to directly take control of the top leader’s position by taking advantage of the power vacuum. President Trump urged the IRGC and the military to lay down their weapons, saying they would provide immunity, and there is information that some Revolutionary Guard organizations are actually asking for immunity, raising the possibility of an internal division of the IRGC.
Inside Iran, large-scale anti-government protests have been taking place in more than 100 cities across the country since December 2025 due to the economic crisis, the plunge in the value of the rial, and soaring prices. Trump called for an uprising for Iranian citizens, calling the strikes “a single chance for the people of Iran to take back their country.” Experts predict three future scenarios for Iran after Khamenei’s death. First, a stable transfer of power under the leadership of the emergency committee is made to turn into a negotiating phase. Second, when the IRGC’s hard-liners take power, leading to Iran’s militarization and a tougher U.S. line. Third, when a civil uprising and external military pressure overlap, the collapse of the system accelerates.
